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Agenda
• What is information security?
• Technical building blocks
• Risk management cycle
• Return on Security Investment
• Architecture for Collecting
quantitative historical data
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What is information security?
• Communication networks
– a lot of users
– quite a lot of
operators
Unauthorized acquisition of information
Unauthorized modification of information
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Typical attack sequence
1. Gaining information
– IP addresses, passwords,
entry points
2. Attack (mostly via the Internet)
– exploits, weak protocols,
misuse of data/passwords etc.
3. Extension of access privileges
– particularly installation of a
back door
4. remove traces
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– modification of data
– injection of data
• replay
• flooding, spamming
– denial of service
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– one key, two copies
• Asymmetric Encryption: two keys
– public key: everybody knows it
– private key: known by recipient
• Steganography:
– hiding the existence of content
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• one key, two copies
Management of Information Security
12












• hiding the existence of content
 c 
cover
Management of Information Security
13



















secret area of recipient
Asymmetric Encryption
• two keys: public key and private key
RecipientSender
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– one key, two copies
• Asymmetric Encryption: two keys
– public key: everybody knows it
– private key: known by recipient
• Steganography:
– hiding the existence of content
Encryption and Steganography
– Fast, secure and cheap!
PGP.com
GnuPG.org
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• Message Authentication Codes
– based on symmetric encryption
– protects from modification by external
attacks
– fast, secure and cheap
• Digital signatures
– based on asymmetric encryption
– two keys
• public key: everybody knows it
• private key: known by recipient
– private key used to sign a document
– public key used to verify
– allows legal accountability and
enforcement (similar to contract signing
in the real world)
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• only the sender can
generate a signed message
secret area of sender
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– based on asymmetric encryption
– two keys
• public key: everybody knows it
• private key: known by recipient
– private key used to sign a document
– public key used to verify
– allows legal accountability and
enforcement (similar to contract signing
in the real world)
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• Digital signatures in the real world are
– Fast, secure, but:
• Expensive!
• Digital signatures
– based on asymmetric encryption
– two keys
• public key: everybody knows it
• private key: known by recipient
– private key used to sign a document
– public key used to verify
– allows legal accountability and
enforcement (similar to contract signing
in the real world)
More exactly:
  Tech. cheap 
  Orga. expensive
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• Public key infrastructure (expensive)
– authenticity of public keys has to be
ensured by technical (cheap) and
organizational (expensive) means:
• digital key certificates (e.g. X.509)
• Certification authority has to
– check physical identification documents
– process is handled by paper (legal
issues)
– for every user, year after year
• Costs (for handling paperwork and the
physical process)
– 10 - 150 EUR per certificate p.a.
• 80 Mill. Germans: > 1 billion EUR
– Who should pay for the security?
        The signer         The recipient
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• Protection of privacy
– Anonymity: Protection of the identity of
a user while using a service (e.g.
counseling services)
– Unobservability: Protection of the
communication relations of users
• Internationally agreed privacy principles
(e.g. EU Privacy Directive of 1995)
– no covert collections of personal
information
– informed consent to purpose prior to
collection
– retention and use only according to
agreed purpose
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– organizations ignore privacy
– international
• Privacy activists
– develop anonymization tools
• http://tor.eff.org
• http://www.anon-online.org
• To respect the privacy laws is
1. a matter of legal compliance,
2. a marketing issue (acceptance of privacy
friendly systems) and
3. cheap!
No storage of personal data, no
effort for privacy protection.
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– ensures that data and services are
accessible to the user within a certain
period of time
• Two Mechanisms:
– Redundancy: duplication of components
or repetition of operations to provide
alternative functional channels in case of
failure
– Diversity: functional identical channels
with a variety of designs provide reliable
functionality in case of (software) failure
• Redundancy and diversity:
– Expensive
Risk management
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Identification of threats
• Question
– »What are the threats?«






– cover all threats
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Assessment of threats
• Question
– »What are the probabilities and
consequences of threats?«
– Risk = probability * consequence





– dependency from assets
– strategic attackers
– correlations between threats
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Control of threats
• Question
– »How to handle risks?«
• Methods
– best practice approaches
– baseline protection
Risik assessment
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Monitoring of risks and measures
• Questions
– »Were the measures effective and efficient?«
»What is the current protection level?«
• Method
– scorecard approaches
according to: Loomans, 2002
Management of Information Security
28



























Management of Information Security
29
Prof. Dr Hannes Federrath
Return on Security Investment (ROSI)
• based on the calculation of an annual loss expectancy for a certain
undesirable event (threat): (FIBS 1979)
• aggregation of ALEs of several events:
(Soo Hoo 2000)
• Return on security investment: (Wei et. al 2001)
• if ROSI >0 then investment was advantageous
ALE0-ALE1: change of the
ALE from year 0 to year 1
Cost: cost of the security
measure
! 
ALE = SLE " ARO
Oi: harmful outcome i
S(Oi): Severity of Oi (in
monetary units)
ALE: annual loss expectancy
SLE: single loss expectancy
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• ROSI
– Alternative calculation as a ratio: (Sonnenreich et. al. 2006)
– Another variation: (Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2003)
• Advantages
– Different security measures can now be compared.
– Security investments can now be compared with other
investments (non-security).
difference of risk exposure
before and after reduction in








(risk exp. before red.)" (risk exp. after red.)
cost of risk reduction
Return on Security Investment (ROSI)
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Some information from the
past
...
Quantitative data is needed
• Risk assessment needs input:
– probability of a security-related event and
– level of damage (cost in case of …)
• Problem:
– enterprises are not willing to reveal such information
– loss of reputation/trust
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Potential Sources for Quantitative Data







Widely used in other
areas (e.g. insurances)
Past != Future
Hardly available so far
Good, however reliable
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Idea: Collecting quantitative historical data
• Idea
– Building a system for the collection of quantitative historical data
on security incidents from different organizations
• Goal
– A database that gives information about impact and frequency of
security incidents
• Existing approaches have a different focus
• Microeconomic theory shows the utility of that concept
• Various possibilities to use that data
– Risk assessment, investment decisions
– Benchmarking between organizations
– Examination of statistical distribution functions, correlations
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Fairness Requirements







– Statistical checks for plausibility
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Current State of Implementation
• Web-based multi-tier Application
– Java Servlets, JavaServer Pages PostgreSQL
• Taxonomy realized as XML-schema





– Data analysis mechanisms
– Interface for ext. data
– Deciding on mechanisms
to provide fairness
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Conclusions
• Security management becomes more challenging
– Increasing dependence on information systems
– Growing number of threats
– Compliance requirements
• Security management is a risk management task
– Measuring costs and benefits of security is challenging
– Quantitative data is needed for modern security management
– Historical data might be a solution for that problem
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